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Título: ¿Cómo cambian los estudiantes de pensamientos relacionados con 
la tarea a pensamientos no relacionados? 
Resumen: Aunque un creciente número de investigaciones psicológicas 
demuestran que los procesos de pensamiento inconsciente de los estudian-
tes pueden estar relacionados con las tareas, la investigación educativa to-
davía tiene que proporcionar evidencia empírica para esta relación en un 
contexto de aprendizaje en el aula. La literatura educativa también es poco 
concluyente en cuanto a si los estudiantes consciente o inconscientemente 
se involucran en pensamientos que no tienen relación con la tarea. Una 
cuestión clave que surge de esta indiferencia es si los pensamientos no re-
lacionados con la tarea facilitan o inhiben el aprendizaje y el desempeño de 
las tareas cuando los estudiantes consciente e inconscientemente cambian 
su atención fuera de los pensamientos relacionados con la tarea. Esta revi-
sión tiene como objetivo mejorar la comprensión de cómo los estudiantes 
cambian de pensamientos relacionados y no relacionados con la tarea. La 
revisión presenta una amplia gama de pruebas de cómo el cambio ocurre 
inconscientemente en lugar de conscientemente. El cambio inconsciente 
como resultado de las emociones negativas de los estudiantes puede inhibir 
en lugar de facilitar los procesos de aprendizaje. Se necesita más evidencia 
en la investigación educativa acerca de cómo ocurre el cambio en los pen-
samientos de los estudiantes dentro del aula. 
Palabras clave: cambio inconsciente; emociones negativas; búsqueda de 
objetivos; mente distraída. 
  Abstract: Although a growing body of psychological research shows that 
students’ unconscious thought processes can be task-related, educational 
research has yet to provide empirical evidence for this relation in a class-
room learning context. Educational literature is also inconclusive as to 
whether students consciously or unconsciously engage in task-unrelated 
thoughts. A key issue arising from this indistinctness is whether task-
unrelated thoughts facilitate or inhibit learning and task performance when 
students consciously and when unconsciously shift their attention away 
from task-related thoughts. This review aims to enhance understanding of 
how students shift from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. The re-
view presents a wide range of evidence for how the shift happens uncon-
sciously rather than consciously. The unconscious shift as a result of stu-
dents’ negative emotions can inhibit rather than facilitate learning process-
es. Further evidence is necessary for the required educational research on 
how the shift in students’ thoughts happens within the classroom. 





Although learning as knowledge acquisition and application can 
happen without deliberate attention (Kuldas, Ismail, Hashim, & 
Bakar, 2013), a widely held view is that better learning (i.e., the 
construction, application, and storage of coherent knowledge 
structures) within the classroom requires students to deliberate-
ly use their limited duration and capacity of working memory, 
that is, to consciously allocate their cognitive resources to task-
related thoughts (Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, 2011). However, 
task-related thought processes can also be unconscious (e.g., 
the transition from having no idea to having an idea or from 
indecision to decision) when a learner’s conscious attention is 
directed elsewhere (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). For ex-
ample, a creative idea or solution may come to a student after 
or while taking a break. A creative solution or idea may pop in-
to the conscious mind of a person who was not thinking of re-
lated problem at the moment (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006). 
In contrast, ‘task-unrelated thoughts’ divert the attention 
away from task performance or task-relevant information 
(Smallwood, Baraciaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003). The atten-
tion is often directed to oneself, taking the self as the object of 
attention (Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003). An exam-
ple of a task-unrelated thought is: ‘‘I was thinking about what I 
was going to do this evening’’ (Smallwood et al., 2004, p. 667). 
Such attentional shifts, also called ‘zoning out’ (Schooler et 
                                                          
* Correspondence address [Dirección para correspondencia]: 
Seffetullah Kuldas, School of Educational Studies, Universiti Sains Ma-
laysia, 11800, Penang (Malaysia). E-mail: seffetu@gmail.com 
al., 2004), can happen in a form of ‘spontaneous cognition’ 
such as mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2013) or 
daydreaming (Buckner, Andrews‐Hanna, & Schacter, 2008) 
that almost all people experience on a daily basis.  
Mind wandering as intentional engagement in task-
unrelated thoughts about an external undemanding task, 
which is not related to a primary task, may yield better results, 
such as creative solutions and ideas (Baird et al., 2012). Reen-
gaging in problem solving after mind wandering, for a long 
incubation period (i.e., a problem is set aside for a long rather 
than a short period of time, 15 instead of 5 minutes, prior to 
further attempts to solve it), may enhance creative problem 
solving (i.e., the incubation effect), especially when an incuba-
tion period is filled with interpolated tasks of low rather than 
high cognitive demand (Sio & Ormerod, 2009). Such an in-
cubation period usually allows for unconscious processing of 
previously encountered problems, thereby yielding creative 
solutions (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Ritter, Van Baaren, & 
Dijksterhuis, 2012). 
However, in demanding tasks (requiring deliberate atten-
tion), mind-wandering as the attentional shift from task-
related to task-unrelated thoughts mostly leads to failures 
(Smallwood & Schooler 2006), mistakes, or slowed perfor-
mance (Buckner et al., 2008). In particular, having worrisome 
thoughts about failure and its consequences while learning or 
performing a task may deplete more cognitive resources and 
inhibit learning and task performance (Kuldas, Hashim, Is-
mail, & Bakar, 2015). Findings related to students’ motivation 
for achievement goals (Elliot & McGregor, 1999; Pekrun, El-
liot, & Maier, 2006, 2009; Senko, Hulleman, & Harackiewicz, 
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2011) show that the allocation of cognitive resources to the 
avoidance of undesirable consequences increases anxiety lev-
els and leaves fewer cognitive resources to exert for better 
learning and task performance. According to ‘Resource Allo-
cation Theory’ (Ellis, 1990, Ellis et al., 1995, 1997a, 1997b; 
Seibert & Ellis, 1991; Kliegel et al., 2005), other negative 
emotions (sadness and hopelessness) also bring task-
irrelevant thoughts into conscious processing of memory 
tasks (e.g., learning and recalling letter sequences), divert at-
tention from the task, and impair task performance.  
The resource allocation theory (mainly concerned with ef-
fects of negative emotional states on working memory per-
formance) is noteworthy as it claims that students consciously 
allocate their cognitive resources to the emotional thoughts, 
which inhibit their task performance. Contrary to the claim, a 
large body of empirical evidence, reviewed by Baumeister, 
Vohs, DeWall, and Zhang (2007), indicates that students’ 
conscious thoughts about their intense emotions (feeling bad 
after failures and good after any significant progress in goal 
pursuits) promote learning and guide ‘future behavior’ (pur-
suing or avoiding an anticipated emotional outcome). Similar 
helpful effect on the ‘current behavior’ is generated by auto-
matic-rapid affective responses. “The automatic affective re-
sponses may also remind the person of past emotional out-
comes and provide useful guides as to what emotional out-
comes may be anticipated in the present” (Baumeister et al., 
2007, p.1). The more intense an emotion is (i.e., feeling bad 
due to a mistake rather than feeling good due to a success), 
the more cognitive reflection occurs (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). However, the evidence falls short 
of identifying task-unrelated thoughts those unduly occupy 
the valuable cognitive resources in relation to current and an-
ticipated emotional states as well as to their conscious and 
unconscious aspects.  
Due to affective thought processes, dissociations between 
the allocation of cognitive resources and its conscious aware-
ness are often apt to happen (Kuldas et al., 2015; Schooler, 
2002). An emotional experience (e.g., feeling of pleasure or 
liking) during task performance can be entirely unconscious 
(inaccessible to introspection) and may drive human behav-
ior, even when a student is motivated and attentive for de-
scribing his/her feelings correctly (Winkielman & Berridge, 
2004). Examples of such unconscious thoughts and behav-
iors are documented in various literature (neuropsychological, 
perceptual, cognitive, educational, social, and psychoanalytic). 
There is ample evidence that unconscious thoughts and de-
fense mechanisms (e.g., suppression of unwanted thoughts) 
inevitably influence students’ cognitive learning and task be-
havior within classroom contexts (Dörnyei, 2000; Kuldas & 
Bulut, 2016; Kuldas et al., 2015). For instance, empirical evi-
dence (Baird, Smallwood, Fishman, Mrazek, & Schooler, 
2013) suggests that students may even lack conscious aware-
ness of an unwanted thought they had attempted to suppress.  
Thus, the unconscious shift (unconscious thought process) 
can be referred to that when students are unaware of (a) how 
they initiate, maintain, develop, or apply thoughts; (b) how the 
unconsciously initiated, developed, or applied thoughts facili-
tate or inhibit their learning and task performance; and (c) when 
they become aware of the shift but unable to articulate reason-
ably how it happened (Kuldas, Hashim, Ismail, Samsudin, & 
Bakar, 2014a). In a nutshell, unconscious interactions within 
and between affects and motives (fears, desires, beliefs) impact 
conscious cognition, thereby leading to the shift in thoughts. As 
this proposition needs to be adequately tested within the class-
room, the various literature deserves scrutiny for the sake of 
providing insights into the question: How does this shift, from 
task-related to task-unrelated thoughts, happen unconsciously?  
To take into account the different forms of unconscious 
thought processes (i.e., automatic, affective, cognitive, and mo-
tivational) is essential for understanding how students uncon-
sciously engage in task-unrelated and -related thoughts. To en-
hance the understanding, the present review with three main 
sections aims at presenting distinct evidence for: (a) how 
thoughts are initiated, maintained, applied, and particularly re-
lated to unconscious affective responses; (b) how affective 
thought processes influence goal pursuits; and (c) how the un-
conscious shift in thoughts (the initiation, sustainment, and ap-
plication of thoughts) happens.  
 
How are Thoughts Initiated and Associated with 
Subsequent Actions? 
 
Whether or not an initiation of thoughts and the corre-
sponding decision to act happen consciously (i.e., whether the 
conscious is preceded by the unconscious) is a very conten-
tious issue in terms of possibility of detecting a specific neural 
network or a particular region in the brain that is responsible 
for the initiation and decision of acts (see Radder & Meynen, 
2013; Schlosser, 2014). Wegner and Wheatley (1999) argued 
that unconscious processes give rise to conscious thought 
about the intention or decision to act; therefore, real causes 
underlying human behaviors originate from the unconscious 
rather than the conscious. Empirical studies on a decision-
making process (Haynes, 2011; Libet, 1999; Schlosser, 2012; 
Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008) illustrated that the un-
conscious activation of thoughts (urges) preceded their con-
scious elicitation. Deciding to act arose prior to conscious 
awareness of activated urges. Yet, participants could con-
sciously follow or reject the unconsciously elicited urge. 
These findings, however, fall short of explaining: (a) how 
much control a learner has over the interaction between un-
conscious and conscious thoughts (Wegner, 2002), and (b) 
how or when unconscious thoughts become conscious, and 
vice versa (Berlin, 2011).  
A series of studies on similar issues found a lack of con-
clusive evidence for students’ conscious awareness and the 
control of how unconscious thoughts impact their conscious 
behaviors and how they engage in task-unrelated thoughts. 
For instance, Giambra and Grodsky (1989; Grodsky & 
Giambra, 1990) examined task-unrelated thoughts during 
reading texts by considering both interest and difficulty. The 
researchers trained participants to distinguish between their 
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intentional and unintentional engagements in thoughts unre-
lated to the task. As a result, even successful readers regularly 
reported unintentional engagement in task-unrelated thoughts 
during reading. Furthermore, attentional demands (task-
difficulty) were unrelated to the frequency of occurrence of 
task-unrelated thoughts. Difficult and easy texts brought 
about frequent task-irrelevant thoughts similarly, whereas dull 
text more often than easy text gave rise to task-unrelated 
thoughts. One may argue that the report of the unintentional 
engagement does not necessarily mean that participants were 
unaware of it, given that these studies focused only on inten-
tion rather than awareness. However, before a reader noticed 
that his/her mind wandered while reading, his/her conscious 
awareness was temporarily absent. In other words, due to the 
fact that participants were unaware of how they got engaged 
in task-irrelevant thoughts, lacking intention is equivalent to 
lacking awareness (see Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al., 2004). 
In similar studies, the engagement in task-unrelated 
thoughts is mainly ascribed to students’ emotions that act as 
the on/off switch to motivation, unconsciously initiating or 
sustaining a goal-directed behavior (Kuldas et al., 2014a). 
Emotion is conceptualized as a dynamic process based on 
subjective appraisals of significant events (Scherer, 2009) 
whereby initiates, accelerates, alters, or interrupts information 
processing (Pekrun, Goetz, Titz, & Perry, 2002). An appraisal 
process is primarily intuitive, immediate, and outside of con-
scious awareness (Robinson & Clore, 2001), but later can be-
come a conscious response to affective stimuli that prepare ac-
tion readiness (Scherer, 2009). The human brain automatically, 
effortlessly, and rapidly reacts to affective stimuli, thereby elicit-
ing various emotions (e.g., fear, anger, or disgust) and generat-
ing affective responses, reactions, or actions (Öhman, 2002; 
Siegel & Weinberger, 2009; Westen, 2006). Emotional reactions 
can occur with minimal stimulation, and thus, precede and alter 
subsequent cognitions (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993).  
Accordingly, students can automatically appraise their 
learning and task performance (Pekrun, 2006). The auto-
emotional evaluation (i.e., undeliberate conscious processing) 
is likely to serve as a guide for a learner to react appropriately 
(approach or avoid) to all stimuli independently of his/her 
goal-directed cognition (Chen & Bargh, 1999). Baumeister 
and colleagues (2007) stated that auto-emotional reactions do 
not have to rest on conscious cognition and may often con-
sist of no more than a simple feeling that something is good 
or bad, to be approached or avoided: “the feeling of liking or 
disliking some stimulus may require nothing more than per-
ceiving the stimulus and making one association” (p.3). 
Therefore, students can auto-emotionally react to stimuli 
(e.g., a teacher’s tone of voice) around a classroom setting. 
“Such automatic emotional reactions are based on earlier ex-
periences that have left an association (a memory trace) be-
tween the emotion experienced in a situation and a specific 
element of the situation” (Hannula, 2006, p. 171, see also 
Smith and DeCoster, 2002 for a review of empirical evi-
dence). 
 
The Interplay between Emotions and Goal Pursuits 
of Students 
 
Emotions as conscious or automatic feedbacks/feelings 
can be very useful for almost any sort of goal pursuit, because 
they guide behavior towards the goal (Baumeister et al., 
2007). Emotions may arise in the course of goal striving 
whenever a student feels that it is likely to achieve the goal. 
This anticipation of success usually evokes positive feelings 
and fosters further efforts towards the goal (Custers & Aarts, 
2010; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Moreover, positive 
feelings may induce coasting, thereby shifting attention and 
effort to other goals or tasks, for which may be needed more. 
In contrast, the anticipation of a lower or no success evokes 
negative feelings and leads to disengagement from the goal 
(Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). Scherer 
(1999) highlighted that an evaluation of whether an emotion-
al experience is desirable or undesirable in terms of subjective 
needs, values, and goals, is mostly subjected to unconscious 
appraisals. Leaners are able to appraise their feelings con-
sciously, but not all the time or instantaneously; the conscious 
mind allows for a limited control over various effects of de-
sires, hopes, or fears on the ways they think, behave, or learn 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Kuldas, 
Satyen, Ismail, & Hashim, 2014b).  
The interplay between emotion, motivation, and cogni-
tion is readily observable in students’ achievement goals (Lin-
nenbrink, 2006), while they are striving to pursue a goal or to 
avoid an undesirable achievement (Ainley, 2006; Kim & 
Pekrun, 2014; Kuldas et al., 2014b; Pekrun, 2006). Linnen-
brink, Ryan, and Pintrich (1999) reported that mastery goals 
(e.g., better learning) decrease negative affect, whereby en-
hance working memory functioning. In contrast, perfor-
mance goals (e.g., better task performance) increase negative 
affect whereby decrease working memory performance. This 
finding suggests that students who are pursuing mastery goals 
usually perceive difficult tasks as a challenge; therefore, they 
are apt to be less concerned with failure and may not be easily 
annoyed, frustrated, or anxious. In contrast, the perception of 
challenge may increase negative affect of students with per-
formance goals, the ones who strive to avoid failure in 
demonstrating their ability in comparison to others. In a simi-
lar way, Pekrun and colleagues (2006) stated that mastery-
approach goals usually promote positive emotions (sustaining 
motivation), whereas performance-avoidance goals tend to 
promote negative emotions and insufficient motivation. 
Some negative emotions (e.g., panic, insecurity, and high anx-
iety) can bring about feeling incompetent, thereby inhibiting 
learning and task performance. The opposite can occur with 
other negative (e.g., mild anxiety) and positive emotions, such 
as curiosity (Kuyper, Van Der Werf, & Lubbers, 2000). How-
ever, it should be noted that, these interactions between emo-
tions and goals do not necessarily require a conscious inter-
vention. Bargh and colleagues (Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barn-
dollar, & Trötschel, 2001) argued that “goals can be triggered 
outside of awareness and then run to completion, attaining 
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desired outcomes. No conscious intervention, act of will, or 
guidance is needed for this form of goal pursuit” (p. 1014). 
They found that performance goals can become activated 
without conscious and deliberate choice; these unconscious 
goals can promote attainment of the desired outcome and 
persistence in task performance in the face of obstacles. 
However, a similar argument for mastery goals could be ex-
amined to explain whether a performance goal draws on un-
conscious cognition more than a mastery goal. 
Students' commitment to a particular goal can make them 
sensitized to cues associated with the goal, whereby they can 
notice and think of the cues, which may be either in their 
mind or a stimulus in the surrounding environment. Such an 
association with any desired achievement-goal is accompa-
nied and perhaps preceded by full emotional arousal, which is 
not yet conscious (Klinger, 2013). Therefore, as Klinger em-
phasized, the act of noticing is not necessarily a conscious act 
all the time. For instance, a student may notice that his/her 
mind had wandered without recognizing the associated frus-
tration. When experiencing such negative emotions, the stu-
dent lacked momentary conscious awareness that his/her at-
tention had become dissociated from task-relevant thoughts 
(Schooler, 2002). In such a case, students are usually unaware 
of how the shift occurs or how their attention is split (Small-
wood & Schooler, 2006).  
Furthermore, when some students become aware of the 
shift, they are usually unable to articulate reasonably how the 
shift happened (Schooler, 2002) or to explain motives for 
their own behavior (Evans, Morgan, & Tsatsaroni, 2006), es-
pecially when they are stressed (Antrobus, Coleman, & Sing-
er, 1967). In an early experimental study, Antrobus, Singer, 
and Greenberg (1966) delivered distressing information that 
induced a personally salient concern and thus increased task-
irrelevant cognitive activities, such as daydreaming and fanta-
sies. The contents of daydreams were a mixture of freely 
wandering thoughts about past and present experiences, any 
personal concern from mundane recounts of recent happen-
ings to expectations about the future (Buckner et al., 2008). 
As Smallwood and Schooler (2013) stated, such mind wan-
dering can be seen as a goal-driven process (but not directed 
toward the primary task) without explicit awareness and in-
tention (controlled processing). Therefore, as a shift attention 
away from a primary task toward task-unrelated inner 
thoughts, memories, fantasies, or feelings, mind wandering 
can lead to failures in task performance (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2013). 
Further neurocognitive findings confirm that due to emo-
tional responses to goal-related cues, particularly under the 
pressure of prospective loss or failure to achieve a goal, cogni-
tive resources can be devoted to mind wandering without the 
mind-wanderer being aware of this devotion (Klinger, 2013). 
The awareness of engagement in mind wandering happens at 
different time than its unconscious initiation and maintenance 
(Schooler et al., 2011). In other words, mind wandering and its 
conscious awareness are not observable at the same time, alt-
hough they partially or totally share the same neural networks in 
the brain (Schooler et al., 2011). According to Schooler and col-
leagues, this sharing does not allow them to occur simultane-
ously or even with an equal frequency. Therefore, as Schooler 
(2002) argued, experiencing mind wandering should be disasso-
ciated from knowing/noticing it (i.e., taking into account the 
difference between initiating, maintaining, and noticing mind 
wandering). 
The suggestion however raises a further issue: how to dis-
tinguish cognitive activities and affects/motives that initiate the 
shift from those that ensure the continuity of the shift? How 
the shift in thoughts starts may differ from how the shift con-
tinues or ends. Smallwood (2013) highlighted that current sci-
entific methods allows for no identification of the moment that 
a given mind wandering episode ends. “Participants may forget 
to indicate that they had mind-wandered or may not even no-
tice that they had temporarily lost track of what they were do-
ing” (p. 522). This inability to characterize the termination of a 
mind wandering (i.e., unknowing when an internal train of 
thought is ended) creates significant challenges in explaining 
how students redirect their attention back to the task at hand, 
prioritize their goals or needs, and how their goals become in-
hibitory, facilitatory, or necessary to reach another goal. 
In consequence, as Dörnyei (2000) contended, a merely 
cognitive approach is not adequate for understanding “how 
multiple goals are prioritized and how the hierarchy of super-
ordinate and subordinate goals is structured” (p. 537).  There-
fore, various motivational influences that are not under stu-
dents’ direct control should be taken into consideration. This 
suggestion reaffirms that “as we approach the 21st century, 
the role of affect and less conscious processes is reemerging 
as a central theme” (Eccles, Wigfield, & Schiefele, 1998, p. 
1074). Students do not merely consciously bring their inter-
ests, beliefs, or wants into learning processes, but also do so 
unconsciously even when they intentionally remember, ex-
press a wish, or make a decision (Jacoby, Lindsay, & Toth, 
1992; Kuldas, Bakar, & Ismail, 2012). While referring to in-
terests and beliefs, they can unconsciously manipulate their 
wishes, desires, and thoughts into whatever they wish to ob-
tain, even if whatever they want is not actually perceptible to 
their senses (Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005). In these 
processes, students cannot easily avoid the unconscious effect 
of desires, expectations, or evaded thoughts over their cogni-
tive and affective thoughts processes and behavioral tenden-
cies. Hence, as Hannula (2006) suggested, the unconscious in 
students’ mind and motivation should be taken into consid-
eration in order to better understand their behavior (how they 
use their cognitive resources) in a classroom setting. 
 
The Automatic and Unconscious Shift in Thoughts 
 
To understand how the shift starts, continues, or ends re-
quires precisely identifying how sensory organs and the uncon-
scious mind sort out information relevant or irrelevant to a task 
at hand, particularly when conscious attention (awareness and 
control over information processing) is directed elsewhere. 
Kastner and Ungerleider (2000) maintained that the attentional 
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capacity of the visual system to allow processing multiple 
stimuli at a given time is limited. Therefore, “in the absence of 
directed attention, multiple stimuli in the visual field interact 
with each other in a mutually suppressive way” (Kastner, De 
Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1998, p. 110). According to 
Kastner and colleagues, directing attention to a stimulus coun-
teracts the suppressive influence of nearby stimuli; this suppres-
sive or competitive mechanism seems serving to filter out irrel-
evant or unwanted information in cluttered visual scenes. Such 
automatic monitoring of thoughts can be ascribed to the lim-
ited capacity.  
However, this ascription does not clarify how task-
irrelevant or unwanted thoughts elude the suppressive mech-
anism, shift the focus of attention, and reduce the attentional 
capacity. This issue becomes clearer in further findings that 
suggest a dynamic-motivational aspect of thought processes, 
encompassing perceptual, emotional, and cognitive behavior 
(Rothermund, Gast, & Wentura, 2011). Gawronski, Deutsch, 
and Strack (2005) showed that the perception and cognitive 
information processing of negative and positive stimuli vary 
according to motivational orientations (goals and needs), ap-
proach, or avoidance tendencies. Therefore, human percep-
tion, attention, and judgment can be under the influence of 
either ‘negativity bias’ (Baumeister et al., 2001; Öhman, Flykt, 
& Esteves, 2001) or ‘positivity bias’ (Balcetis & Dunning, 
2006; Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005). The for-
mer suggests that negative stimuli attract and hold attention 
automatically, while the later means that perceptual and cog-
nitive processing is biased towards positive stimuli. These 
findings confirm McGinnies’s (1949) suggestion that percep-
tions are also structured with respect to reward, need fulfil-
ment, attitudinal orientation, potential anxiety, and release 
from tension. McGinnies suggested a perceptual defense or 
filtering mechanism of visual stimuli that “serves, in many in-
stances, to protect the observer as long as possible from an 
awareness of objects which have unpleasant emotional signif-
icance for him” (p. 244). The perceptual defense allows hu-
mans to unconsciously suppress or even block some sensory 
information related to negative emotional stimuli or events 
(Erdelyi, 1974).  
As Erdelyi (2006) pointed out, such evidence as in 
abovementioned studies substantiates a basic proposition of 
‘Psychoanalytic Theory of the Unconscious Mind’ that both 
human sensory organs and the unconscious mind preclude 
undesirable information from entering into the conscious 
mind. On the basis of their experimental findings, Anderson 
and colleagues (Green, 2001; Levy, 2009) proposed a sup-
pression mechanism as posited by Freud: when people en-
counter stimuli that remind them of unwanted thoughts or 
unpleasant past experiences, they consistently try to avoid 
such thoughts from entering their conscious awareness. Fur-
ther evidence also indicates that humans unconsciously ap-
proach making a new decision that is associated with desira-
ble thoughts, but avoid such an approach when thoughts are 
undesirable (Epstein, 1994; Chen & Bargh, 1999). A growing 
body of such evidence for the unconscious approach and 
avoidance behavior has been considered as the experimental 
foundation for the theory of the unconscious mind, support-
ing that conscious behavior has a preliminary unconscious 
guidance (see Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Berlin, 2011; Beutel, 
Stern, & Silbersweig, 2003; Kuldas & Bulut, 2016; Solms & 
Panksepp, 2012; Westen, 1998, 1999). Further research is 
needed to test this proposition of the unconscious mind the-
ory in relation to a learning task in a classroom setting.  
 However, as Kihlstrom (2008) stressed, the evidence 
does not necessarily mean that the unconscious is a repository 
of primitive sexual and aggressive instincts and therefore 
mental contents are rendered unconscious by a defensive 
mechanism, such as repression. The evidence is rather for “the 
cognitive unconscious—cognitive processes that operate auto-
matically and unconsciously” (Kihlstrom, 2008, p. 589), refer-
ring to percepts, memories, knowledge, and thoughts that are 
inaccessible to conscious awareness. The cognitive unconscious 
allows humans to manipulate information implicitly and associ-
atively.  
Notwithstanding the validity of Kihlstrom’s argument, 
cognitive unconscious cannot be easily dissociated from the 
unconscious mind; both propose mental processes that are 
inaccessible to conscious awareness and control. Evidence for 
both theory indicates that goal-directed cognition is accom-
panied by: (a) unconscious ‘associative memory networks’ 
(e.g., beliefs, wishes, desires, and thoughts), and (b) ‘uncon-
scious procedures’ such as affects, motives, defenses (Westen, 
1998). An activation of thoughts is an evocation of the relat-
ed functions such as affects/motives (e.g., anxiety). These 
unconscious networks and procedures alter emotional states, 
guide human behavior, and thus, influence most conscious 
experiences (see Greenwald, 1992; Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, & 
Tataryn, 1992; Westen, 1999, 2006). Hence, the assertion that 
recent findings does not support the unconscious mind is in-
conclusive.  
As a result, there is a dynamic interplay between affect, 
motivation, and cognition; a negative affective stimulus can 
trigger related cognition (evoking mode-congruent thoughts), 
thereby defocusing attention and reducing both information-
processing time and attentional capacity for task-related 
thoughts (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). On one hand, therefore, 
deliberate attempts to develop thoughts related to positive 
emotional states (e.g., happiness) may involve suppression of 
other thoughts related to the counterparts (e.g., sadness). On 
the other hand, conscious attempts to monitor or to suppress 
unwanted thoughts may unwittingly initiate or automatically 
activate more evaded thoughts (Wegner, 1997). As these 
thought processes lead to high cognitive load (i.e., taking up 
valuable space in working memory) and thus undermine con-
scious capacity to notice the occurrence of a suppressed 
thought, little or no cognitive resource would be available to 
regulate thoughts and emotions (Baird et al., 2013) that are 
germane to learning. In other words, available cognitive capaci-
ty can be insufficient for conscious/deliberate processing of 
further task-related thoughts, which, in turn, substantially de-
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crease motivation for task performance (Roets, Van Hiel, & 
Kruglanski, 2013).  
However, the distinctive descriptions of the human mind 
and sensory organs give rise to a further issue: how to distin-
guish between the bias effect, the perceptual defense, and the 
suppressive function of visual stimuli, if processing positive 
information automatically filters or blocks negative infor-
mation, and vice versa? Further studies on this issue are 
needed to elaborate the extent of the distinctions (if the func-
tions are mutually exclusive). Prospective findings need to be 
examined in relation to the unconscious mind theory and to 
other distinctively described unconscious (e.g., automatic, 
implicit, intuitive, associative, or cognitive unconscious) initi-
ation, sustainment, and application of thoughts. A convincing 
reason for these distinctive descriptions might be that the 
functions of human mind and sensory organs may not be eas-
ily grouped under a single heading (i.e., the conscious and un-
conscious mind). Instead, the terms ‘conscious processes’ and 
‘unconscious processes’ (Westen, 1999), or as Evans (2008) 
proposed, ‘System 1’ (unconscious) and ‘System 2’ (con-
scious), can be used in further examinations of how students’ 
unconscious thoughts and behaviors facilitate their conscious 
acts (e.g., how unconscious processes facilitate task-related 




To enhance the understanding of how students shift the allo-
cation of cognitive resources from task-related to task-
unrelated thoughts, this narrative review has synthesized evi-
dence for unconscious cognitive and affective/motivational 
thought processes. The reviewed educational literature on the 
conscious use of cognitive resources remains unclear how 
students consciously do the shift: what are their conscious 
reasons to devote the resources to task-unrelated thoughts 
those impair learning and task performance? According to a 
consensus among the reviewed studies on the cognitive, per-
ceptual, and affective (motivational) aspects of learning, stu-
dents cannot be always conscious of their learning processes, 
nor do they ensure a desired change in their behavior by be-
ing conscious learners. Engagement in task-unrelated 
thoughts often happens outside of conscious control, inten-
tion, and the awareness. Therefore, the review has argued that 
the shift mostly takes place without students’ conscious 
awareness and control, but how it starts may differ from how 
it continues or ends. Hence, how or when students engage in 
task-unrelated thoughts should be disassociated from how 
they maintain and notice. To make this dissociation, further 
research is needed to distinguish cognitive activities and af-
fects/motives (a) that initiate the shift from those that ensure 
the continuity of the shift; and (b) that end the shift or a mind 
wandering inhibitory to learning and task performance (ex-
plaining how students redirect their attention back to the task 
at hand). 
The reviewed studies lack a consensus about whether the 
cognitive processing capacity or the unconscious associative 
memory networks (wishes, beliefs, and thoughts) and uncon-
scious procedures (affects, motives, defenses) primarily ob-
struct the conscious use of cognitive resources for task-
relevant thoughts. The unconscious mind theory suggests 
that both human sensory organs and the unconscious mind 
prevent a good part of information, which is particularly un-
desirable, from entering into the conscious mind, while the 
other perspectives generally point out the constraints of cog-
nitive capacity. Notwithstanding the lack of consensus, the 
perspectives concur that (a) the perceptual and cognitive pro-
cessing of negative and positive stimuli can vary according to 
motivational goals/needs, and (b) the perceptual and cogni-
tive defense (suppression mechanism) serves to avoid con-
scious awareness of some information patterns related to un-
pleasant emotional stimuli. 
This review has mainly concluded that taking merely con-
scious account of the main issue (how the shift occurs) falls 
short of understanding (a) what determines the content of 
task-unrelated thoughts to be inhibitory to task performance 
(e.g., how thoughts are activated and associated with subse-
quent acts, such as the unconscious evocation of thoughts 
about failures instead of successful achievements), (b) how 
students prioritize (superordinate and subordinate) their 
goals/needs for the resource allocation. To take into account 
unconscious affects/motives is central to the understanding. 
Students need the unconscious cognitive and affec-
tive/motivational processing as much as they need the coun-
terpart in learning processes. For instance, students’ perfor-
mance goals can be activated with or without deliberate and 
control attention, thereby facilitating achievement of the de-
sired outcome and persistence in task performance in the face 
of obstacles. However, neither the conscious nor the uncon-
scious always facilitates every learning case; either of them 
may impede learning and performance of a cognitive task un-
der time constraint and uncertainty, or with distractive emo-
tional (motivational) values of the task. For such cases, a pre-
cise differentiation between conscious and unconscious mo-
tivation for the allocation of cognitive resources to task-
unrelated thoughts is needed. In particular, the circumstances 
in which unconscious affective thoughts motivate or demoti-
vate students to exert the necessary amount of cognitive re-
sources for better learning should be clearly identified, so as 
to provide a guideline for teachers, explaining how to help 
students benefit from the unconscious cognitive and motiva-
tional processing. To provide new insights into these issues, 
further studies might revise and draw on the resource alloca-
tion theory and the unconscious mind theory to collate evi-
dence for how negative emotional experiences (affective 
thought processes) lead to task-unrelated thoughts; to test if 
the inhibitory shift from task-related and task-unrelated 
thoughts occurs consciously. 
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